Themes, Doctrine, and Pedagogy in the 2013-2014 National Health Law Moot Court Competition Problem by Bernstein, Anita
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
7-2014
Themes, Doctrine, and Pedagogy in the 2013-2014
National Health Law Moot Court Competition
Problem
Anita Bernstein
Brooklyn Law School, anita.bernstein@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Legislation Commons, Other Law Commons, and
the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
35 J. Leg. Med. 345 (2014)
Journal of Legal Medicine, 35:345–354
Copyright C© 2014 American College of Legal Medicine
0194-7648 print / 1521-057X online
DOI: 10.1080/01947648.2014.936256
THEMES, DOCTRINE, AND PEDAGOGY IN THE
2013–2014 NATIONAL HEALTH LAW MOOT
COURT COMPETITION PROBLEM
Anita Bernstein*
INTRODUCTION
Vaccination and anti-vaccine sentiment give a moot court problem writer quite
the bountiful harvest. As a subset of public health, the topic fills domestic
national policy and debates about how to spend money. In an exception to the
almost total defeat of products liability reform at the federal statutory level,1
Congress has managed to enact the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.2
An interactive map by the Council on Foreign Relations, documenting what
it called “vaccine-preventable outbreaks” worldwide, went close to viral in
early 2014.3
The issue contains favorites of mine that I think are of general interest.
Safety, health, the collective action problem, civil liberties, and individuals
and communities in tension are included for starters. In the law school course
that I have taught more often than any other, the iconic O’Brien v. Cunard
S.S. Co. gives first-year students the haunting image of an Irish immigrant
∗Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. My thanks to Loren Pani for
tireless research assistance; W. Eugene Basanta and Cheryl Anderson for their partnership and guidance
throughout the construction of the problem; David Orentlicher, who suggested that I include the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act; and my fellow judges at the National Health Law Moot Court Compe-
tition final argument, Victoria L. Green, M.D., Julio M. Fuentes of the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, and G. Patrick Murphy of the United States District Court of the Southern District of Illinois,
who found more content in this problem than I knew was there. Thanks also to a couple of medical
professionals dear to me, Joseph Bernstein and Kirsten Hickerson, for helpful tutelage about anti-vax
as a public-health topic.
1 See generally Anita Bernstein, A Model of Products Liability Reform, 27 VAL. U. L. REV. 637 (1993).
2 Id.; Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An Empirical Analysis of Tort
Reform’s Impact on Businesses, Employment, and Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 257, 277 (2013)
(situating the NCVIA and other narrow federal reforms against a backdrop of failure for comprehensive
products liability reform efforts generally).
3 Vaccine-Preventable Outbreaks, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/interactives/GH
Vaccine Map/#map (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
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346 INTRODUCTION
teen, fresh off the boat in Boston harbor, trying to say no to a smallpox shot
by lifting her arm.4 Freedom, a key theme in the writings I read and create,
poses a question to this great public health initiative whenever it imposes its
mandate: “Why won’t you leave me and my child alone?”
The most straightforward way to put vaccination into a moot court frame
would have been to present a litigant, probably a prosperous mother, resisting
vaccination as a claimed breach of liberty, in effect saying: “Please leave me
and my child alone.” Quickly I rejected that path. Current law in the United
States permits parents and guardians to refuse vaccines: that much freedom
they have won.5 The 2013–2014 National Health Law Moot Court Competition
problem needed more varied stakes, more nuance, richer doctrine. Below I
note some inclusions that I chose toward these ends.
I. THE STORY
Hanover University General Hospital v. Rutherford featured a record
containing four items. I gave participants an opinion by a federal trial court; an
appellate reversal of the trial court’s decision; an excerpt from the petitioner
hospital’s bylaws, which pertained to the dispute; and a statement of two
questions before the Supreme Court of the United States, which they had to
argue.
The defendants had suspended hospital privileges from the plaintiff,
a cardiac surgeon named Thomas L. Rutherford, for about a month in the
summer of 2012. Unmollified despite the relatively swift restoration of his
status, Dr. Rutherford brought an action against the hospital, Hanover Uni-
versity General Hospital (HUGH), and four named individuals. He attributed
his loss of privileges to a post he had published, on a Facebook-like site
called ConnectSpace, just a few days before the hospital’s “corrective action”
commenced. Dr. Rutherford contended that he had suffered retaliation for his
speech. Because HUGH, as written into the problem, was a state actor and Dr.
Rutherford a quasi-employee, the plaintiff could state his first claim, which,
for participants, was the first certiorari question, in constitutional terms using
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
4 See O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd., 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891).
5 Several courts, interpreting state statutes, have compelled parents to state their objections in religious,
rather than philosophical or secular-principled, terms. See Toward a Twenty First Century, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 1820, 1825-26 (2008). When parents are willing to stay inside the religious-objection framework,
courts spare them tough questions about what exactly they believe. See, e.g., Sherr v. Northport-E.
Northport Union Free Sch. Dist., 672 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (permitting parents to withhold
vaccination on religious grounds even though they did not claim to belong to a religious organization);
see also In re LePage, 18 P.3d 1177 (Wyo. 2001) (prohibiting the state health department from inquiry
into the sincerity of a parent’s religious beliefs about vaccination).
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2013–2014 NATIONAL HEALTH LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION 347
The second certiorari question asked participants to apply the federal
Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA) to part of the dis-
pute. Dr. Rutherford had added contract and tort claims to his Section 1983
action, complaining of retaliation for speech; specifically, he alleged that de-
fendants breached his employment contract and caused him financial losses
and emotional harm. If the “professional review” that HUGH used to investi-
gate Dr. Rutherford qualified for immunity, then Dr. Rutherford could receive
no damages for these common-law claims.
In my tale, the link confected for Dr. Rutherford’s social media post,6
which for technical reasons never made it into the distributed problem, directed
Dr. Rutherford’s 1,011 “friends” to an essay and a photograph of his toddler
grandson, Declan. The essay contained musing by Dr. Rutherford that perhaps
vaccines cause autism after all. Dr. Rutherford offered this speculation—along
with a couple of snide comments about a vaccine-promotion research grant
at HUGH—following what he mentioned as the recent news that Declan had
been diagnosed with autism.
The four named defendants reacted to the post—or at least they acted
immediately after it went up; they disputed causation—with what looked like
a mix of villainy and bureaucracy. Anthony Glower, M.D., recipient of the
vaccine grant that Dr. Rutherford had groused about, texted Alicia Polishov,
M.D., high up in HUGH administration, to tell her about Dr. Rutherford’s
friends-only social media post just hours after it was published. Dr. Polishov
pulled together an ad hoc committee to investigate Dr. Rutherford’s record
at HUGH. She parked her live-in companion, Dr. Seamus O. Milk, a cardiac
surgeon recently retired from HUGH, on the ad hoc committee, along with
Dr. Glower. (A third physician filled out the committee, but Dr. Rutherford did
not name him as a defendant. This affable-sounding individual “goes along to
get along,” said the plaintiff during his deposition.) Serving ex officio was the
final named defendant, one Mary Elizabeth Kreutzer, a nurse-administrator
who told the committee that Dr. Rutherford was abrasive.
Taking the committee’s deliberations and findings into account, HUGH
suspended Dr. Rutherford’s privileges. Dr. Rutherford got the news in a letter
dated July 31. On August 24, the hospital reversed itself and returned Dr.
Rutherford’s privileges and he returned to work.7 Soon after, he filed an action
in federal district court.
6 The link I created to portray Dr. Rutherford’s fictional social media site was http://www.
connectspacemedia.com/tlrutherford.
7 I wrote it that way for two reasons: first, to eliminate a procedural due process claim that would have
given participants too much work, and, second, to put a little thumb on the scale in favor of the physician,
because case law on both of the certiorari issues seemed to me inclined against him.
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348 INTRODUCTION
II. NOW WHAT?
With a narrative written and claims identified, I faced decision points in
the preparation of the two opinions.
Although some prior National Health Law Moot Court Competition
problems included concurrences and dissents, I opted for binary simplicity:
dismissal of all claims by the trial court followed by wholesale reinstatement
by the appellate panel. In another departure from a common, prior problem
pattern, my appellate decision gave its own statement of facts rather than in-
corporate the trial judge’s version. I wanted opinionated opinions.8 Integrating
themes into the presentation continued this approach.
III. WHY THEMES? LEARNING FROM JUDGE KOZINSKI’S
ESSAY ON MOOT COURT
Hanover University General Hospital v. Rutherford aligns with the lay-
out familiar in appellate advocacy pedagogy—a constitutional question first
and a federal statute second. Although I hewed to this tradition, my work
was haunted by a law review article by the famed federal appellate judge
Alex Kozinski.9 Kozinski’s critique of moot court as a misleading version of
appellate litigation has always seemed correct to me, on one hand, yet not
altogether constructive, on the other.
Kozinski reminds student readers interested in appellate advocacy that,
with respect to their future employment, the number of retainers ahead that
will ask them to expound on a constitutional issue before the nation’s highest
court hovers at approximately zero.10 Worse, moot court sends an even less
accurate message about what is available to practitioners: the record, into
which a skilled appellate advocate must dive deeply.11 Its pages reveal the
stakes of the disagreement and often predict its resolution. Preparing for
appellate advocacy means exploring the record to learn what judges on the
panel will want to know more about, mastering the facts that good advocates
recite fluently upon request. Moot court problems tend to glide past this reality
by omission.
One can imagine the record of a real, or more real, Hanover University
General Hospital v. Rutherford. But I could not include it. Prospective parti-
cipants considering whether to join a competition browse a problem that must
be complete in relatively few pages. A moot court problem also needs, pardon
8 After the competition, I was delighted to learn that participant teams, which chose which of the two
sides to write briefs for, had split as equally as they could: 15 for HUGH and 14 for Dr. Rutherford.
9 Alex Kozinski, In Praise of Moot Court—Not!, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 178 (1997).
10 Id. at 189-92.
11 Id. at 194.
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2013–2014 NATIONAL HEALTH LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION 349
the expression, “appeal.” Participants expect something sexy like the First
Amendment, and I do not blame them. And, so in composing, I tried to nod
in the direction of Kozinski’s point—after all, he is correct—by adverting to
more of the missing record than I had space to provide.12
The other way I took Kozinski on Moot Court to heart was even less
literally compliant with the judge’s stated wishes. But I link it nevertheless to
his thesis. I read what he wrote as a plea for more. A moot court problem,
Kozinski and I both believe, ought to do more than present a fictional factual
record about a dispute and ask advocates to find and apply case precedents
to support one of two binary outcomes. Kozinski rooted his belief in his long
experience on the bench. My vantage point was necessarily farther from the
real world of federal appellate advocacy, but I, too, like all problem-authors,
had a job to do. What more more would I add? Not bulky pages of a record,
for reasons just noted. Not more doctrine: with procedural due process built
into its story, Hanover University General Hospital v. Rutherford already had
one legal issue too many from the start. I chose instead to weave in a couple
of themes.
A. Theme 1: Employment Matters
The protagonist of Hanover University General Hospital v. Rutherford
lost his job for only a few weeks. As a successful surgeon in his mid-60s based
at a university hospital and the holder of a stent patent that, I implied, earned
him significant income, he did not suffer the severe consequences of contem-
porary American unemployment of which some persons who participated in
the exercise probably had personal knowledge. If “the 1%” demarcation in the
United States is household income of more than $350,000 or so each year,13
Dr. Rutherford and his family likely dwelled among that cadre.
My making a federal case out of a short encounter with unemployment
purposely emphasized an issue that will loom large in the participants’ future.
Employment goes beyond—but also includes—healthcare and health law.
Around the time of the oral arguments in November of 2013, the President
nominated a new head of the Federal Reserve Bank, an economist who had
“been talking consistently about what the economy needs for a healthier
recovery—jobs and wages.”14 The sector of interest to the National Health
Law Moot Court Competition holds a strong role in U.S. job-creation and
12 See generally id. This included e-mails and texts created by the parties, as well as an excerpt from the
HUGH bylaws, and acronyms and jargon.
13 During the Occupy Wall Street days of 2011, one blogger wrote that an annual adjusted gross income of
$343,927 put a taxpayer in that band in 2009. Kay Bell, Top 1%: How Much Do They Earn?, BANKRATE
(Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/taxes/top-1-percent-earn.aspx.
14 William Greider, It Took 3 Men 30 Years to Screw Up the Economy—Can One Woman Fix It?, THE NA-
TION (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/178199/it-took-3-men-30-years-screw-economy-
can-one-woman-fix-it.
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350 INTRODUCTION
employment policy,15 but I hoped to touch on more than just the work prospects
of healthcare professionals.
Employment in the United States, in my view, poses problems of basic
fairness.16 Because employers typically have both more wealth and more
experience in the types of strife that arise between them and the people they
hire, they enjoy a power advantage in their employment relations. What looks
to me like rectifications to alleviate an imbalance—especially labor unions
and statutory employment protections enforceable in court—apparently looks
to employer advocates like provocations to be resisted.17 In my lifetime, union
membership has plummeted all over the world but most steeply in the United
States.18 Harms to the non-union, white-collar workforce have been more
diffuse and ambiguous, but researchers report decades of de-skilling, wage
declines, and diminution in morale.19 For this topic, law students are at a
critical juncture.
On one hand, they have joined a profession. They may distance in-
dividuals who hold law licenses with the occasional lawyer joke or casual
disparagement, but they know they have enlisted in a group that experiences
numerous controls and privileges, both formal and unwritten.20 They are vir-
tually lawyers now. They can see an employment-related claim through the
lens of statutes and precedents.
On the other hand, their relative youth makes them well situated to
relate to a scenario about popularity and power struggles that stem from
emotion. The named defendants had ganged up on Dr. Rutherford. In turn, Dr.
Rutherford, like some targets of school bullying whom he may have evoked
for participants, did not behave like the proverbial perfect angel. Participants
had to consider how he had yelled at vulnerable persons; typed low-quality
prose about vaccination at his computer and hit the “publish” key; and either
15 See U.S. News & World Report Announces Best Jobs of 2014, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Jan. 23, 2014),
http://www.usnews.com/info/blogs/press-room/2014/01/23/us-news-announces-best-jobs-of-2014
(noting that 7 of the 10 top-ranked occupations “are from the health care sector”); David Orentlicher,
A Restatement of Health Care Law, 79 BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (reporting that the United
States spends about 18% of its gross domestic product on healthcare).
16 I do not teach employment law, but the topic has long had a place in my research agenda. See, e.g., Anita
Bernstein, Foreward: What We Talk About When We Talk About Workplace Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 923
(2006); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997).
17 See David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 528-29
(2009) (internal citations omitted).
18 Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millenium: A Historical Review and Critical
Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV. 351, 371 (2002), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2201&context=bclr.
19 Lawrence Mishel, Unions, Inequality, and Faltering Middle-Class Wages, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 29,
2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/ib342-unions-inequality-faltering-middle-class (correlating the
decline of unions with the decline of white-collar employment).
20 See generally Anita Bernstein, Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of Lawyers, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 479 (2009).
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2013–2014 NATIONAL HEALTH LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION 351
failed to prepare for his deposition or prepared for it but strayed heedlessly
from advice. I wanted to remind participants of the ambivalence they likely
would experience in reaction to the “pile-ons” and hostility delivered by mobs
to individuals. An employment context builds on this awareness to connect
these reactions to the problem with the menu of legal remedies. Should the
doctor prevail in his protest against an adverse experience at work? If not,
why not, as a matter of doctrine as well as fairness: how does the law block
his claim? If he ought to prevail, what redress would comport with his injury?
B. Theme 2: Unintended Consequences
If I ran the curriculum, law students would have to read the 1991 classic
The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. Albert O. Hirschman
needs only a few pages to cover unintended consequences memorably. He
identifies the reactionary narratives that arise in response to reform proposals:
Antagonists of progress claim that although an idea may sound good, its
implementation will likely fail and perhaps even cause new harms. Maybe
even the opposite of what reformers want to encourage will manifest.
It is not that the perversity-jeopardy alarm is wrong, Hirschman con-
tinues. Unintended adverse consequences can, indeed, ensue from a well-
intentioned change. The folly for policymakers is to think that that one stance
in response to reformist ideas—either naı¨ve embrace (for progressives) or
instinctive resistance (for conservatives)—will yield safety in a reliable way.
From the peril we face, there can be no risk-free way out.
The HCQIA half of the problem brought up unintended consequences
in a context that participants probably had not yet considered, even if they had
taken a health law class. I had goals here beyond the inclusion of this theme.
“Read the statute,” foremost: this famous piece of advice from Justice Frank-
furter always deserves another iteration.21 To fare well in their brief-writing
and oral arguments, participants had to examine 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(1),
§ 11112(a)(2), § 11112(a)(3), and § 11112(a)(4)—four sections of a large law
that needed to be studied both separately and together. Because courts have
interpreted HCQIA with such striking favor to institutional defendants, the
problem forced advocates to manipulate case law that simply does not divide
evenly. The inclusion also brought supplemental jurisdiction and common-law
claims to a problem dominated by federal constitutional law. But the aspect
of HCQIA that I found most interesting was how this legislation turned out,
in contrast to how it must have seemed during the bill-crafting stage.
HCQIA immunity, as was mentioned, gives shelter from damages to
institutions and individuals who participate in the professional review of
21 Frankfurter was reported to have had three rules of statutory interpretation: “(1) Read the statute; (2)
read the statute; (3) read the statute!” In re England, 375 F.3d 1169, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting
HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 202 (1967)).
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352 INTRODUCTION
physicians. The statute strove “to improve the quality of medical care in this
country by encouraging the medical profession to rid itself of bad doctors.”22
Enacted when policymakers shared a belief in a malpractice insurance cri-
sis, this measure had bipartisan appeal.23 Nobody apart from personal injury
lawyers, as I recall, liked the lawsuit method of deterring and disabling med-
ical malpractice. So how much better to extirpate the problem through peer
review?
Peer review had never done this particular job well, true, but the historical
shortfall was understandable. Why would a doctor work to get rid of a bad-
apple peer when doing so would generate hostility from the bad apple’s friends,
loss of time for people who get paid for their time, possibly lost referrals, and
a risk of being sued for damages? Statutory immunity could not eliminate the
professional intangibles, but it could remove tort and contract damages from
reviewers’ list of worries.
A generation later, results suggest what Albert Hirshman’s “rhetoric of
reaction” predicted. First is “futility.” The health law-and-policy literature
contains no attempt to link HCQIA immunity with an increase in policing of
bad doctors or a drop in the rate of injuries attributed to malpractice. It is fair
to infer that such gains did not materialize. Physicians, themselves, respond
to the prospect of peer review with what one journalist described as either
“dread” or “indifference.”24 The esteemed RAND Institute found medical peer
review less reliable than its preferred alternative, which it called “structured
implicit review,” because a post-hoc examination cannot know what it is
looking for until an adverse event or other trigger starts the process.25
As for “perversity” and “jeopardy,” Hanover University General Hos-
pital v. Rutherford adverts to what other writers have documented. Our pro-
tagonist might have been the victim of a bad-faith policing initiative. “Sham
peer review,” the phrase quoted dismissively by the trial judge, is, indeed, not
a legal category as she said, but doctors do complain about it.26 One health law
22 Charity Scott, Medical Peer Review, Antitrust, and the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50 MD. L. REV. 316,
318 (1991).
23 Sponsored by Democrats and Republicans, the legislation prevailed by voice vote. H.R. Rep. No. 99-903,
Pt. 1, at 4 (1986).
24 Neil Chesanow, What You Don’t Know About Peer Review Can Hurt You, MEDSCAPE BUS. OF MED. (Jan.
21, 2011), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/735133. “Dread” here does not mean a socially useful
prod to hew to good practices but rather reflects a “paranoid” fear of an “inquisitional and shaming”
process. Id.
25 See Peer Review: Measuring the Quality of Physician Care, RAND HEALTH, http://www.rand.org/health/
surveys tools/peer review physicians.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
26 See, e.g., Cohlmia v. St. John Med. Ctr., 906 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1216 (N.D. Okla. 2012) (rejecting this
characterization); Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 592 F. Supp. 2d 208, 212-13 (D. Mass.
2009) (disallowing expert testimony on the sham peer-review phenomenon); Leigh Ann Lauth, Note,
The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005: An Invitation for Sham Peer Review in the
Health Care Setting, 4 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 151, 167 (2007) (“Many physicians are beginning to take
the view that ‘[n]ot only is the peer review process corrupt, it’s ineffective.”’) (citations omitted).
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2013–2014 NATIONAL HEALTH LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION 353
scholar has detailed anticompetitive behaviors commenced under the rubric
of HCQIA-sheltered review.27 Congress was optimistic back in 1986 when it
equated immunity with patient welfare; but irresponsibility, as another scholar
noted in another context, is among the consequences of immunity.28
C. Theme 3: Objectionable Speech
To give full effect to the law-based right of free speech, or so I suggested
in the problem, one needs a set of words that make real trouble. Speech with-
out an objectionable aspect never gets worse than anodyne. The notoriously
unavailing-at-best counsel that victims of bullying still hear—“Ignore them,”
“Sticks and stones may break my bones . . . ,” “Don’t feed the trolls”—rests
on a misbegotten premise that words are bland.29 Real violence and danger
occur but only through other means, says this unhelpful nostrum.
At the same time, I wanted the instance of objectionable speech to
contain some depth. The plaintiff could have spoken variations on a familiar
ugly theme: racist epithets, online misogyny (a topic I address in a forthcoming
paper),30 homophobic taunting, or egregiously partisan politician-bashing, for
example. Well-plowed grounds like these lay outside the problem, I decided.
It is health law we are expounding.31 No need for the protagonist to be a
free-floating bigot. His objectionable speech ought to pertain to public health.
It needed a little plausibility, too, a soupc¸on to which readers could relate.
Putting my cards on the table: as a layperson devoid of training in
medicine or epidemiology, I side with the problem’s trial judge, who scoffed
at what she read as pernicious nonsense and slapped Dr. Rutherford with
summary judgment. I celebrate taxpayer-funded and mandated vaccination as
a great step forward for public health. The individual defendants of Hanover
University General Hospital v. Rutherford were probably a nasty pack of
office plotters, but, in my opinion, they were right about vaccines and Dr.
Rutherford was wrong.
And yet I know a smart, experienced speech pathologist who suspects an
association between vaccination and autism.32 A well-educated pharmacist of
my acquaintance has opted, at least for now, to skip the DPT vaccine sequence
for her children. She is inclined to acquit vaccination on the autism charge but
27 See Scott, supra note 22, at 318.
28 Mary J. Davis, The Supreme Court and Our Culture of Irresponsibility, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1075,
1119 (1996).
29 See EMILY BAZELON, STICKS AND STONES: DEFEATING THE CULTURE OF BULLYING AND REDISCOVERING THE
POWER OF CHARACTER AND EMPATHY 11 (2013) (considering how “sticks and stones” brushoffs of school
bullying became obsolete, although they rest on some truth).
30 Anita Bernstein, Abuse and Harassment Diminish Free Speech, 34 PACE L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
31 But cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (“We must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding.”) (emphasis in original).
32 What I found interesting about this suspicion is that the speech pathologist keeps it humbly to herself,
even though she is forthcoming generally in conversations. I had to ask her what she thought.
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354 INTRODUCTION
wonders, as did Dr. Rutherford, whether the practice is a “great uncontrolled
experiment on little kids.”
It is not that I credit these worries, exactly. Rather, I think they make the
point that words that get speakers in trouble can contain danger, not just idle
hostility. Objectionable speech matters.
CONCLUSION
Health law scholars often remind readers of the great breadth of their
field.33 The West hornbook runs more than a thousand pages—and it was
published 14 years ago;34 all topics named in its table of contents have been
growing since then. The roster of issues considered during the years through
the National Health Law Moot Court Competition reads like a compendium
of the major debates about U.S. domestic policy.35
Diversity, intellectual curiosity, civic repair, and interdisciplinary en-
gagement are among the aspects of health law that will continue to lure people
to the subject and to its great national moot court competition. In 2013–14,
an expansive and inclusive approach proved well suited to an expansive and
inclusive field. Participants worked from doctrines, pedagogy, and themes that
complement the fundamentals of health law to enlarge what I drafted: they
made it better.
33 See Mark A. Hall et al., Rethinking Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 342 (2006) (introducing
a symposium); see Orentlicher, supra note 15 (arguing that the subject is ready for an American Law
Institute restatement); Jessica L. Roberts, Health Law as Disability Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963, 1968
n.6 (2013) (surveying fields that fall under the rubric of health law).
34 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW (2d ed. 2000).
35 See Prior Moot Court, S. ILL. U. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.law.siu.edu/healthlaw/proirmootcourtcomp.
php (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
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